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[The piece below contains excerpts from an article by Arqueles Morales appearing in a recent issue
of the Central American Information Bulletin produced by the Agencia Nueva Nicaragua, Managua.
Annual subscriptions to the bulletin are available for $25 (48 issues), by contacting Agencia Nueva
Nicaragua, 1260 National Press Building, Washington DC 20045.] Despite important progress made
in four days of talks in the southern border town of Sapoa between the Nicaraguan government
and the contras, the negotiations had bogged down as of presstime on the "modus operandi" or
the terms by which the contras must move into mutually-designated cease- fire zones...Among
the many problems slowing down the arduous negotiations has been the lack of decision-making
authority on the part of the contras' technical commission, made up of lower level commanders who
have had to consult with contra leaders in Miami at every turn. A more serious problem, however, is
what Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega described as "dilatory tactics": the constant inclusion of
proposals and counterproposals on issues which clearly deviate from the March 23 Sapoa accords...
Contra military commanders, for example, have demanded that their forces be allowed to exercise
control over and to remain indefinitely in the seven "reconcentration zones" zones agreed upon.
Next, the commanders have demanded permission to receive military supplies and to modernize
their weaponry during the time they remain in the zones. Not only do these demands explicitly
violate article six of the Sapoa accord, but they would in practice convert Nicaragua into a country
with two standing armies. Moreover, the demands would hand over to the contras on a silver platter
"liberated zones" that they have never been able to win in seven years of military aggression. In
response, President Ortega pointed out publicly that the Esquipulas II peace plan signed by the
five Central American presidents last August...rules out the continued existence of irregular armies.
The peace plan calls for cease-fires which must be immediately followed by the demobilization,
disarming and reintegration into civilian life with all constitutional rights and guarantees afforded
to citizens of those forces. Major General Joaquin Cuadra, Deputy Defense Minister and head of the
technical commission sent by the Nicaraguan government to negotiate in Sapoa, warned that the
contras' demands not only make a mockery of Nicaraguan national sovereignty, but run contrary
to both the spirit and the letter of the Esquipulas and the Sapoa accords. "National sovereignty
is not under discussion in this forum or in any other," said Cuadra. It is clear that the March 30
approval by the US Congress of $48 million of "humanitarian aid" to the contras, at a time when
the counterrevolution has reached its weakest point militarily..., contributes in no way to a climate
conducive to the negotiations. It was in the framework of such encouragement they received from
Washington that the contra leadership has insisted on the demand that its meeting in Managua
(scheduled at presstime for April 15, after the contras postponed the original date of April 6) with
government authorities be broadened to include a series of political and public relations activities.
As if it were a delegation from a foreign government coming on an official state visit, the contras
insisted on holding receptions with the diplomatic corps, briefing sessions with political parties,
meetings, interviews, rallies and other public gatherings. In accordance with the Sapoa accord,
the purpose of the Managua meeting is to negotiate the "definitive cease-fire." In addition, and in
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adherence to Esquipulas II, the Sapoa document stipulates that contras will be able to participate
fully as normal citizens in Nicaragua's social and political life once they have disarmed under a
comprehensive cease- fire. In an April 5 letter to contra leader Adolfo Calero, President Ortega
charged that the contras have completely distorted the content of the accord by expecting that they
will be afforded such treatment at this time in Managua. They want to go around "as if they were an
official delegation from the United States Congress," said Ortega, in allusion to the typical agendas
of high-profile meetings and political activities that congressional delegations often arrange for
themselves in Managua. trying to prolong a war which they have already lost on the battlefield
once again becomes attractive for the contras. Next, the approval of that aid in Washington makes
clear that the US government has not yet resigned itself to supporting the peaceful resolution of the
conflict it has created and nurtured...

-- End --
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